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The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine andrew meltzoff’s discoveries 
concerning neonatal imitation in the light of husserl’s discussion of fremderfahrung. 
We criticise meltzoff’s explanatory model aim (active intermodal mapping), which 
is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the aim 
model does not seem to properly reconcile the vindication of the intermodal character 
of imitation with the idea that early imitation is based on organ identification: these 
two claims seem to be reconcilable only at the cost of sacrificing the active, non reflex-
like character of imitation. Secondly, the account of aim does not fit in with the ordinary 
first-person experience of adult imitation. In its stead we propose a different explanatory 
approach, which is consistent with a basic phenomenology of imitation and does not 
depend on organ identification, but on the “rhythmic resonance” of gestures.
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the question of intersubjectivity in husserl’s thought is one of the most 
important and controversial issues in phenomenological debate. at the same 
time, the question of intersubjectivity, with special reference to empathy and 
imitation, has been the object of cognitive science analyses, some of which 
have also received the attention of the general public. our aim in the following 
pages will be to provide a discussion of a well-known scientific finding in 
the light of, and in sight of, a phenomenological approach to the question of 
intersubjectivity. There are remarkable methodological difficulties in allowing 
the naturalism embraced by cognitive sciences and the fierce antinaturalism 
of husserlian phenomenology to interact. We will not try to properly settle 
here this intricate question, but we just intend the following analysis as a 
tentative exemplification of a phenomenological use of experimental results 
in psychology. More specifically, we will briefly re-interpret Andrew Meltzoff ’s 
experimental discoveries concerning neonatal imitation by providing them 
with a phenomenologically inspired interpretive framework, alternative to 
the one proposed by meltzoff.
husserl devotes great attention and thousands of manuscript pages to the 
problem of the foundation of intersubjectivity, and we cannot try to provide 
here any plausible resume of such formidable analysis. We will limit ourselves 
to recall the special role played by the question of fremderfahrung (the 
experience of the other). in one of the crucial theoretical steps of his analysis, 
husserl tries to explore our primal intuition of the other, understood as 
an alter ego, an other-subject-like-me. the leading question is: how can we 
recognise the other, so that we can discern at the same time the other’s 
extraneousness and the other’s identity with the ego that we ourselves 
are? according to husserl we cannot have an immediate primordial access 
to the alter ego, because this would not allow for our intuition of the other’s 
alterity: we could not distinguish the other from ourselves. husserl tries to 
explain our intuition of the other by resorting to the idea of an apperception 
supported by an analogy between our body and the other’s one (hua i, 140-
141). apperception in husserlian terms is an association which pre-delineates 
the completing traits of the perceived entity. apperception is an association 
of essential and not merely psychological character. this means, among other 
things, that the “analogy” between our body and the other’s body cannot 
be traced back to a contingent external “resemblance”. husserl does claim 
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that there is a kind of resemblance at the roots of the constitution of the 
“pairing” (Paarung) that supports our identification of the Other as such, but 
the nature of such resemblance is clearer as to what it is not, than with regard 
to its positive traits. it is commonly acknowledged that husserl’s treatment 
of the issue of fremderfahrung remains partially unfulfilled. Our present 
purpose is to see if it is possible to draw from known empirical investigations 
some suggestions relevant to that husserlian problem, while preserving the 
methodological constraints that phenomenology requires.
over the last thirty years andrew meltzoff and colleagues have produced a series 
of pathbreaking studies, which have deeply influenced our understanding of 
children’s imitation. meltzoff’s experiments have shown that a sort of imitative 
process, which we will call proto-imitation, can be found even in neonates few 
hours after birth; such imitation concerns also gestures, like tongue protrusion, 
which do not allow any visual coupling of the gesture to be imitated with the 
imitating one (in the absence of mirrors).
the most crucial experiments devised by meltzoff et al. (1977; 1979; 1983) 
show what follows: after the display of some gestures (tongue protrusion, lips 
protrusion, mouth opening, and, to older infants, finger movements and side 
movements of the head) a majority of newborns were showing a greater amount 
of repetitions of the displayed gesture than of other gestures. For instance, 
in an experiment where the experimenter alternately performed sessions 
of tongue protrusions (tP) and mouth openings (mo), the infants were 
performing more often mo than tP in the mo session (on average 7.1 vs. 5.4), 
and they were more often performing tP than mo in the tP session (9.9 vs. 6.5) 
(meltzoff and moore 1983, 705). also the duration of the infant’s gestures was 
correspondingly greater for the displayed ones than for the others (ibid. 706). 
these results may appear weak, because of their merely statistical consistency, 
but thenceforth they have been repeated many times, by different researchers 
and with further methodological caveats. it is important to note that the 
displayed gestures (tP and mo) belong to the ones that newborn infants 
spontaneously perform. therefore, the relevant imitation does not produce the 
institution ex novo of an unfamiliar gesture after an exemplification. What 
happens is rather conceivable as the summoning of a propriocepted gesture 
by means of a visually perceived gesture. these experimental results must be 
qualified by the following limitations:
1. most infants are always producing some (even wholly 
incongruous) responses and, in a minority of cases, even responses 
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akin to the alternative exemplification (e.g., TP responses  
to mo examples). 
2. the responses of the newborns are not immediately emerging in 
an accomplished fashion, but are gradually approximating a clearer 
and clearer replication over the course of the experiment. 
3. many infants (more than 60%) do not respond at all or interrupt 
their responsive involvement, because of greater urges, in the course 
of the experiment.
as meltzoff notices, the looseness in responding (1 and 3) and the apparent 
dependence on learning (2) are incompatible with responses governed by 
fixed action patterns or reflexes. Responses do not appear to be “ballistically” 
triggered  from appropriate stimuli. Unlike reflexes like the palmar grasp 
reflex and the sucking one, the working of proto-imitation rather seems to 
show the character of a primitive response of “sociability”, requiring a relaxed 
situation and an exploratory attitude.
at this point meltzoff tries to provide a causal explanatory account of the 
mentioned experimental outcomes. he does so by resorting to an explanatory 
model called active intermodal mapping (aim), whose general traits are the 
following:
[i]mitation is a matching-to-target process. The active nature of the matching 
process is captured by the proprioceptive feedback loop. The loop allows infants’ 
motor performance to be evaluated against the seen target and serves as a basis 
for correction. according to this view, the perceived and produced human acts 
are coded within a common (supramodal) framework which enables infants to 
detect equivalences between their own acts and ones they see. (meltzoff and 
moore 1997, 180)
these general traits of the aim seem to be required by the descriptive basis 
of the experiment: the idea that proto-imitation is a “matching-to-target” 
process is supported by the fact that apparently proto-imitative acts 
progressively approximate to the exemplified ones. And the supramodal 
dimension to which proto-imitative acts must refer is required by the 
fact that apparently imitation can take place between gestures belonging 
to different sense modalities (e.g. vision and proprioception). as we will 
see, this part of meltzoff ’s proposal is consistent with phenomenological 
descriptions. But meltzoff goes beyond this explanatory level. he tries 
to discern the “core mechanism” of imitation by postulating a system of 
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“organ identification” active at birth. The idea is that the newborn is able 
to identify her own body parts as “corresponding” to the other’s parts 
and limbs. this idea is introduced by meltzoff in order to explain both 
the general transmodal ability to imitate and the appearance that babies 
sometimes start the imitating process just by activating the relevant body 
part (e.g. unspecific activation of the tongue in imitation of TP) (Meltzoff 
and Moore 1997, 183). And how is supposed such organ identification to take 
place? Meltzoff formulates two hypotheses. The first one is that organs are 
innately identified on the basis of their form, which we are evolutionarily 
predisposed to recognise. this hypothesis is suggested by the apparently 
analogous discovery that neonates are innately sensitive to human faces, 
that is, to general face-like configurations. This option is the one that 
meltzoff prefers and is also an interpretation that has been later endorsed 
by shaun gallagher (2005) in support of his idea of “body schema”. an 
alternative option mentioned by Meltzoff is that organs could be identified 
through their unique spatiotemporal pattern of movement (“kinetic 
signature”): the ways in which tongues, fingers or arms respectively move 
have specific kinematic constraints that may be sufficient to identity each 
organ.
at this point, we have to observe in passing that the explanatory proposal 
that Meltzoff embraces (the first hypothesis) departs from any possible 
consistency with phenomenological analyses. the reason for this departure is 
the naturalistic assumption that in the last instance explanations must take 
the form of a reduction to spatiotemporal causes. meltzoff rightly remarks 
that imitation must take place at a supramodal level (that is, at a level common 
to different sensuous modalities), but then he takes for granted that the roots 
of both modal and supramodal levels must be causally traced back to events in 
physical space (brain mechanisms). husserlian phenomenology would object 
that spatial determinations as such are not modally innocent, since they are 
constituted with reference to specific modal acts (visual and tactile kinestheses). 
insofar as we assume that spatiality and causality are beyond the scope of 
experiential constitution, we just enrol in the mainstream naturalistic club.
But this observation is wholly internal to the phenomenological horizon 
and is destined to sound unconvincing to naturalistically oriented ears. 
let us therefore try to show the limits of meltzoff ’s explanatory proposal 
from within. Let us take his first option: here imitation as a matching-to-
target should be guided by organ identification, which in his view implies 
the identification of forms and relations between forms. he calls such innately 
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cued responses “organ relation (or) end states”: they are the propriocepted 
innate responses that correlate with visual configurations like tongue-to-
lips, tongue-between lips, etc. (meltzoff and moore 1997, 184). here however 
we have a problem: how can the identification of seen and propriocepted 
organs (or or end states) be conceived if they are all to be considered 
“forms”? such “forms” cannot be visual (spatial) forms, as the mentioned 
case of the neonatal recognition of faces might misleadingly suggest. But if 
they are not forms in a visual sense, how else should we understand their 
formal nature? if we look for supramodal roots of protoimitation, the model 
of the inborn sensitivity to facial traits is inapplicable. such forms cannot 
unilaterally belong to any single modal dimension.
But could we not just say that some visual forms are simply able to prompt 
appropriate propriocepted responses? could we not just suppose that unknown 
evolutionary developments led our organism to produce appropriate couplings 
between different modal percepts like seen or end states and propriocepted 
or end states, and that there is nothing more to ask? of course we could, but it 
is not what we need either to account for Meltzoff’s findings or to account for 
the mature forms of imitation that we experience in the first person. Inborn 
immediate coupling of responses is pertinent to physiological reflexes, but 
could not support the active and generative character of imitation. there is no 
doubt, as husserl has often argued, that we rely on countless passive responses 
that are not in the power of our conscious activity, but ordinary imitation is an 
activity guided by an attempt to approximate a target, and such target cannot 
be the particular sensuous exemplification that we have in front of our eyes. it must 
be a supramodal or transmodal type. strangely enough, although meltzoff is 
perfectly aware of the necessity to resort to a dimension of active representation 
in order to account for imitation, he does not see that an innate coupling of 
organs (or or end states) would never provide such a dimension: even if the 
visual appearance of eyes, tongue or lips would elicit immediate activation of 
eyes, tongue or lips, this could not account for the imitation of gestures. inborn 
organ identification of a kind may be an initial cue that eases early imitation, 
but cannot explain imitation and much the less can support the recognition of 
Otherness. In fact, it is precisely the focus on organ identification that seems 
to be misplaced. While it is well possible that some reflex responses contribute 
to an early bodily orientation in some newborns (recall that the majority of 
babies subjected to the experiments do not provide results, either positive 
or negative), immediate matching of seen and felt organs (or organ relations) 
cannot support the imitation of gestures. 
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Meltzoff ’s idea seems to be that a series of identifications of relative position 
between organs (or end states) could work somehow like dots to be connected 
by pencil: if i proprioceptively know what corresponds to visual tongue-in-
mouth and tongue-between-lips, then i could perform imitation as drawing 
a line between such end points. But this idea, in the absence of essential 
supplements, would be clearly inadequate: if the relevant “dots” are reflex 
responses, they do not take place in any unitary representational space, as dots on 
paper would do. This means that we have no guide telling us how to “fill the 
gap” between reflex responses (which, by assumption, display correlations 
between visual events and propriocepted ones), because such responses 
just do not belong to a common representational space: in the experiential 
“content” of my eye-blinking and of my knee-jerk respectively there is nothing 
that posits them in specific spatial relations, which can be attributed only by 
reflecting on my body image. Meltzoff, it must be noted, is apparently aware of 
this problem and thinks that such “connective tissue” between innately cued 
spots could be originally provided by “body babbling”, by which he means the 
spontaneous repetitive motion of limbs and facial organs that babies produce 
even before birth. Body babbling should enable the subject to learn how to 
connect the propriocepted innate responses (“or end states”) with each other 
and with spontaneous muscular activity so that a kind of body map obtains. 
this reasonable hypothesis, however, shifts the weight of the argument from 
the role of innate responses to that of the proprioception of spontaneous 
muscular activity (“kinaestheses”, husserl would say).
indeed, if the problem is the one of the transition from the perception of the other’s 
body to the proprioceptive awareness of my body, the idea of an innate mechanism 
producing a static mapping of visual positions to propriocepted positions does not 
do. This model would give priority to the replication of static configurations, which 
in meltzoff’s own experiments appear to be the exception, rather than the norm. 
But this model appears to be especially awkward if we consider our first-person 
experience of imitation, which is after all the ground from which we draw the 
intuition that neonates may be producing proto-imitative acts.
What happens when we, as adults, try to imitate a facial expression? except 
for professionals who may train in front of a mirror, the majority of people 
are able to immediately grasp a sort of “overall style” of the expression and 
to reproduce it, even if they do not have any idea about how their face looks. 
Actually, if our imitative attempts are shown to us (they were filmed, say) 
we are often baffled by how our face looks. The same could be seen in the 
imitation of dance steps: uneasiness aside, we can easily imitate the general 
style of the dance, the rhythm of moves, their lightness or tension, etc. without 
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any specific awareness of the precise position of our feet, of the lines that we 
are following, etc. true enough, this primary level of imitation can lead to 
outcomes sadly distant from the model, as any amateur dancer can recognise 
with the merciless help of a mirror; nevertheless something essential has 
been grasped and can be recognised by others. it is important to observe that 
this stylistic or rhythmic factor can be recognised and transposed even in the 
absence of any organ identification. We can imitate even the joyful attitude of a 
tail-wagging dog, although no obvious matching of organs is available. We can 
imitate human, animal and even inanimate motions with limbs that do not 
belong to the model to be imitated. and our tentative dancing movements can 
spontaneously coordinate with musical features in an instance of supramodal 
“imitation”. it seems that there is an imbalance between the spontaneity 
with which mature imitation can relate to the rhythm/style of perceived 
motion and the difficulty in picturing to ourselves where our bodily parts and 
what their spatial relations are. in the following this “rhytmic” or “stylistic” 
dimension will be named rythmòs, after the ancient greek term, which has 
an appropriately comprehensive meaning including ordinary rhythm, 
proportion and style of patterns; (for an extensive discussion on rythmòs see 
Zhok 2012, 123 et seq.).
coming back to meltzoff ’s hypotheses, we should ask whether the second 
hypothesis that he formulates, without subscribing to it, is more satisfactory. 
This option implies that organ identification would be obtained by detecting 
not forms but “kinetic signatures”. this idea relies on the discovery of the 
peculiar human sensitivity to biological motions, whose multifarious features 
are recognised with spontaneity and surprising swiftness (Johansson 1973). 
this idea, however, does not seem to be adequately exploited by meltzoff, who 
is pursuing organ identification as a necessary step towards early imitation. 
indeed, it is conceivable that the “kinetic signature” of some gestures is 
characteristic enough to lead to the supramodal recognition of specific 
body parts. this is especially possible if we think that newborn infants 
have a limited repertoire of propriocepted gestures in their command and 
therefore do not need to perform many refined distinctions in order to find 
correspondences between seen and propriocepted gestures. the pre- and post-
natal body babbling involves few stereotypies and this means that the child 
does not need a high level of discrimination in order to discern, for instance, 
MO from TP. Two problems, however, remain: first, this would not amount to 
organ identification, but to gesture identification (with incidental identification 
of the relevant organs), and second, if the correspondence is still read as an 
immediate elicitation of specific organ activation, then we remain closer to 
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reflex responses rather than to active imitation. Nevertheless, the analysis of 
early imitation in terms of a kinetic correspondence between gestures opens 
up a new and more promising view on imitation and its tie to empathy.
it must be noted that the “kinetic identity” between perceived and 
propriocepted gesture must not properly concern movement as it is ordinarily 
understood. although in the third person (i.e., for objective representation) 
the gestures that I perform and experience in the first person can be described 
as motions (i.e. changes of position over time), they are not propriocepted by 
me as something taking place in objective space and time. this means that 
the propriocepted gesture does not have ordinary “motion” in common with 
the perceived gesture. But then what do they have in common? We must take 
seriously the demand that the dimension where imitative matching can take 
place be supramodal. the representational space where motions are placed is 
inescapably tied to visual aspects (motions are represented as events in an ideal 
visual field), whereas our disposition to “feel in resonance” with seen gestures 
does not belong to such representational space: we can spontaneously perceive 
the “similarity” between the lowering pitch of a whistle and the approaching 
trajectory of a falling object. such similarity is no exterior congruence of 
sensuous traits. seen motions, propriocepted muscular activations and 
unfolding sounds can have in common a “way of changing”, an instance of 
rythmòs, to which we must not attribute any particular sensuous aspect: it 
does not occupy either a visual space or a tactile space or any other sensuously 
qualified dimension, since its “substance” is rather a temporal form. it must be 
noted that a truly supramodal dimension is necessarily superindividual: it 
must be possibly valid for an indefinite plurality of sensuous instantiations. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that rythmòs must also be a motivating 
dimension, in the sense that instances of rythmòs are apparently salient for the 
newborn perceiver, whose corresponding gestures are called forth.
a notion like a supramodal motivating rythmòs can account for the early 
imitative response better than any organ identification, which can be either 
derived from the correspondence between instances of rythmòs (as “kinetic 
signatures”), or attributed to inborn reflex-like cues inessential to the 
imitative process. From this point of view some of the results of meltzoff ’s 
experiments become more easily interpretable. 
as we said above, many newborn babies did provide apparent responses to 
the exemplified gestures, even if they were the “wrong” answers. But, if we 
take organ identification to be explanatorily prior and dynamic gesture 
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correspondence to be a secondary achievement derived from the former, 
then responses that get the pertinent organs wrong (tP instead of mo) are 
not exactly what one would expect. on the contrary, if we reckon that at 
first babies respond to instances of rythmòs as such (primarily conceivable 
as biological motion), we can account for the “statistic” trend toward proper 
matching of gestures. the majority of babies respond just to instances of 
rythmòs, and the more the corresponding process unfolds, the better some of 
them refine the dynamic pattern of their responses, down to the appearance 
of imitation proper.
the character of motivating salience of the instances of rythmòs accounts 
also much better for the paradoxical nature of imitation and empathy, such 
that we experience ourselves at the same time as identical with and different 
from the other. What is proximately felt, what is “mine”, is rythmòs, whereas 
its contingent modal realisations are irreducibly “other”, extraneous. 
What is in common is what enables communication, primarily emotional 
communication through the style of gestures (softness, regularity, abruptness, 
violence, etc. are immediately detectable) (see stern 2000, 48 et seq.). What 
remains ineradicably different is the specific sensuous implementation of the 
gestures as well as the relevant character of reactivity or spontaneity of each 
implementation.
Finally, the notion of rythmòs is not a mere hypothesis consistent with, but 
superimposed to, phenomenological observations: rythmòs is intuitively 
available in a plurality of phenomena which go well beyond (early or mature) 
imitation. the idea that imitation could be the primary access leading to 
empathy with the other and her “state of minds” seems now somewhat 
misleading. our primal access to the other does not go either through direct 
coupling to the other’s body parts, or through direct access to the other’s 
feelings (in this case we would be the other). We have direct access to the other’s 
expressions of feeling, which are embodied in specific instances of rythmòs. in 
other terms, we need not think that we first produce a more or less faithful 
copy of the other’s behaviour, on the basis of a structural correspondence of 
bodies, and then gain a mediate access to the meaning of the other’s gestures. 
rythmòs in the gestures is primarily evident and is expressively intelligible 
even in the absence of the recognition of specific body correspondences: this 
is the reason why we need no mediate introduction to grasp the expressive 
motions of animated objects in cartoons (brooms, cars, haunted houses, etc.). 
The way of moving is enough to define the object’s “emotional dispositions” 
as well as its targets and spatial orientation, even in the absence of any clear 
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reference to eyes or limbs. this perspective could be critically applied to 
theoretical views like the one recently proposed by gallagher (2005), where 
a body schema endowed with the same structure of the average body image 
is used as explanatory key for cross-modal and intersubjective relations (see 
Zhok 2012, 202 et seq.).
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